COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND POWER ASYMMETRY IN NIGERIAN PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES: THEORIZING THE FG – ASUU’S AGREEMENT

Abstract

The paper discusses the negotiations of collective bargaining and power imbalance in the Nigerian universities in the form of a theoretical discussion of the life of a Federal Government (FG) -Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) agreement. Even after numerous talks and the official agreements, the most recent of which was the 2009 Accord industrial disputes, the issue of potential effectiveness and sustainability of the collective bargaining in the industry remains, as the number of strikes is increasing. Based on pluralist theory of industrial relations, power-resource theory and perspective of the fiscal political economy, the study has put together a composite conceptual framework to explain the recurring stability in FG and ASUU relation. The research integrates secondary data in the form of collective agreements, federal budget reports, and macroeconomic indicators using a qualitative and document based analytical method to explore the interaction of structural state power, the organizational ability of unions, fiscal volatility and institutional enforcement mechanisms to influence the bargaining outcome. As can be seen in the analysis, although the strike action by ASUU delivers short-term concessions, structural asymmetry caused by centralized fiscal control and poor enforcement structures limits the compliance in the long term. Agreeing with each other is further moderated by fluctuating oil-dependent revenues, which strengthens cyclical negotiation, strike and completion of partial agreements. The theoretical contribution of the study is the concept of implementation asymmetry, which helps to differentiate between the differences in the enforcement of the post-agreement and the power imbalances in the negotiation stage. It claims that sustainable industrial peace in the Nigerian state universities needs institutional re-alignment, when allocated over a period of years, enhancement of enforcement, and reestablished governance independence. The results can be used to test empirically and give policy-relevant information to reform the public sector collective bargaining in the developing political economies.